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La loi no 53 de 2003 sur l’autonomisation économique élargie des Noirs est l’une des mesures prises en 
vue de promouvoir le droit à l’égalité qui est inscrit dans la Déclaration des Droits de la Constitution de la 
République sud-africaine.  Son objectif est donc d’équilibrer le terrain économique sur lequel jouent les 
Noirs et les Blancs en Afrique du Sud. L’autonomisation économique élargie des Noirs est une initiative 
gouvernementale pour permettre aux Noirs de participer pleinement dans l’économie. La loi était 
promulguée notamment pour faciliter une autonomisation économique élargie des Noirs en apportant des 
changements en profondeur dans la composition raciale des structures de propriété et de gestion ainsi que 
dans les emplois qualifiés des sociétés existantes et nouvelles. La question qui se pose est de savoir si un 
tel objectif est en train d’être atteint et quel rôle la Commission de contrôle des pratiques malhonnêtes joue 
pour atteindre cet objectif. Les statistiques montrent que cet objectif est encore loin d’être atteint et la 
Commission joue plutôt un rôle négatif dans sa réalisation.  
 
Abstract 
The Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003 is one of the statutes enacted to promote 
the right to equality, which is enshrined in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa. It is therefore aimed at balancing the economic playing field of black and white people in South 
Africa. Broad-based black economic empowerment is a governmental policy initiated to enable the black 
people to participate in the economy meaningfully. The Act was promulgated inter alia to facilitate broad-
based black economic empowerment by achieving a substantial change in the racial composition of 
ownership and management structures and in the skilled occupations of existing and new enterprises. The 
issue that arises is whether this objective is being achieved and how the Commission of fronting practices 
affects the achievement of this objective. Statistics show that this objective is not being achieved and that 
the Commission of fronting practices plays a negative role in its achievement. 
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Introduction 
Parliament enacted equality legislation to redress the imbalances caused by 
apartheid in South Africa. The Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment 
Act 53 of 2003 (‘B-BBEEA’) is the legislative framework which governs black 
economic empowerment (‘BEE’). BEE is defined as “a specific government 
policy to advance economic transformation and enhance the economic 
participation of black people in the South African economy” (Kruger 2011: 
209). According to Osode, BEE is  
 
a process aimed at strategically transforming the South African 
economy by inter alia spreading equity holdings to incorporate 
previously disadvantaged South Africans, re-organising management 
structures and ensuring greater participation of the majority in the 
economy to achieve economic justice (Osode 2004: 108).   
 
BEE is seen as necessary to remedy the economic imbalances, which 
occurred because of apartheid (Ncwadi, Onceya & Siswana 2014: 268). 
Subsequent to the 1994 elections, discussions were held to determine what the 
appropriate mechanisms were to pursue BEE (Horwitz & Jain 2011: 301). A 
Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Commission ('B-BBEECom') 
was established in May 1998 to determine which barriers existed to “black 
participation in the economy and to propose a viable BEE strategy” (Horwitz & 
Jain 2011: 301). The B-BBEECom recommended that national legislation be 
enacted to facilitate BEE, which resulted in the B-BBEEA (Horwitz & Jain 
2011: 301).  
The B-BBEEA was enacted in terms of section 9(2) of the Constitution, 
which makes provision for legislation to be enacted in order to achieve equality 
and to remedy historical imbalances. As time progressed, BEE had different 
meanings. However, two dominant approaches emerged the minimalist 
approach and the maximalist approach. As far as the minimalist approach is 
concerned, this approach 
  
emphasises a proportional representation of previously marginalised 
groups of people in the public and private sectors. It focuses BEE 
discourse and practice on the career mobility or advancement of black 
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Career mobility or the advancement of black professionals and those on 
managerial levels is important in order to change the composition of the 
structures who not only manage enterprises, but also those who own 
enterprises. The minimalist approach defines BEE in terms of the creation of a 
black business class (Gqubule 2006: 5). This implies that BEE takes place 
every time a group of black individuals secures government tenders or obtains 
share certificates in previously white businesses (Daniel & Southgate 2006: 
456).  
This approach emphasises the “distribution of the positions of the 
privileged between a few people within existing structures” (Daniel & 
Southgate 2006: 456). It “does not seek to alter the conditions that 
simultaneously engendered privileges on the one hand and sustained 
exploitation and marginalisation of the majority on the other. Rather, it seeks to 
alter the racial composition of privileges and exploitations to create a new 
circuit of racial capital accumulation. A minimalist approach promotes the 
empowerment of a few black individuals and the disempowerment of the 
majority of the black population who do not have access to the new circuit of 
racial accumulation” (Gqubule 2006:5). While this approach may not promote 
the empowerment of the majority of black people, it does promote the 
empowerment of black professionals.  
The maximalist approach to BEE on the other hand entails restructuring 
on a wide scale involving an improvement of the conditions of the majority as 
well as more inclusive decision-making (Daniel & Southgate 2006: 456). The 
maximalist approach  
  
entails the generation and redistribution of resources to the vast majority 
of the people, ranging from skills and educational training to land 
redistribution. Additionally [this approach stresses] the overall 
democratisation and transformation of institutions and organisational 
cultures rather than the mere inclusion of a few individuals from the 
previously disadvantaged communities in the ownership and 
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The B-BBEECom decided to adopt the maximalist approach (Gqubule 
2006: 11). BEE should thus be viewed within the broad scope of empowerment 
processes which includes inter alia meaningful ownership, skills and 
management development, rural development, specific measures to empower 
black females and job creation (Gqubule 2006: 11). Meaningful ownership 
refers to a change in the racial composition of ownership structures of both 
existing and new enterprises (B-BBEEA: section 2(b)). Skills and management 
development refers to the increase in access to economic activities and skills 
training (B-BBEEA: section 2(c)). Rural development entails the empowerment 
of both rural and local communities by enabling access to economic activities, 
land, infrastructure, ownership and skills (Musahara 2016: 128). Women should 
also be empowered to own and manage enterprises and to increase their access 
to economic activities, skills training and infrastructure (B-BBEEA: section 
2(d)). Job creation consists of the promotion of economic transformation to 
enable black people to participate in the economy meaningfully (B-BBEEA: 
section 2(1)). 
The B-BBEEA contains a number of objectives. However, this article is 
limited to a discussion on the objective contained in section 2(b) of the B-
BBEEA. The purpose of this article is to determine whether the objective 
contained in section 2(b) of the B-BBEEA has been achieved and how the 
commission of fronting practices affects the achievement of this objective.  
In order to address the aforementioned, this paper will commence by 
providing a discussion on the application of BEE, after which the objective 
contained in section 2(b) of the B-BBEEA will be discussed. This will be 
followed by an assessment to determine whether the objective contained in 
section 2(b) of the B-BBEEA has been achieved. The paper will then proceed to 
a discussion on fronting practices as well as the legislative efforts made in order 
to prevent fronting practices from taking place.  
 
Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment 
BEE is aimed at “effecting a more equitable distribution of economic wealth 
and has been branded as the essential second wave of transformation after 
democratisation” (Balshaw & Goldberg 2014: 13). The beneficiaries of BEE are 
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“Black people” is “a generic term which means Africans, Coloureds, 
Indians and Chinese who are citizens of the Republic of South Africa by birth 
or descent; or who became citizens of the Republic of South Africa by 
naturalisation before 27 April 1994, or on or after 27 April 1994 and who have 
been entitled to acquire citizenship by naturalisation prior to that date” (B-
BBEEA: section 1). 
Unlike other legislative enactments, compliance with the legislation 
governing BEE is voluntary insofar as the private sector is concerned. However, 
BEE affects almost every participant in the South African economy one way or 
another (Balshaw & Goldberg 2014: 14). The practical working of BEE 
requires an enterprise to measure its BEE status in order to obtain a rating 
(Seate & Pooe 2016: 696).  
The Codes of Good Practice enacted in terms of the B-BBEEA (‘B-
BBEE Codes’) contain various scorecards, which are utilised by enterprises to 
obtain a BEE rating. The B-BBEE Codes refer to the enterprises that make use 
of the B-BBEE Codes to calculate their BEE ratings as “measured entities”. 
The BEE rating is used by the measured entity's customers, to whom goods are 
supplied and/or services are rendered, as a basis upon which service providers 
are chosen (Balshaw & Goldberg 2014: 17). The level of a measured entity's 
rating is important by the virtue of the fact that it provides a competitive 
advantage in circumstances where entities are competing for the same business. 
It is for this reason that enterprises are choosing to have a BEE rating, even in 
circumstances where compliance is voluntary. 
Enterprises give BEE serious consideration since it has become an issue 
which is relevant in obtaining business and in the retention thereof (Balshaw & 
Goldberg 2014: 25), one example being tenders for government work where it 
is imperative for an enterprise to have a competitive BEE rating (Seate &Pooe 
2016: 697). The B-BBEEA and the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework 
Act 5 of 2000 (‘Procurement Policy Act’), together with its Regulations provide 
“the parameters within which organs of state may give preferential treatment to 
historically disadvantaged suppliers when making procurement decisions” 
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At times compliance is a prerequisite in order to obtain and secure 
business (Horwitz 2011: 309) even in circumstances where government work is 
not being obtained. Such circumstances arise where private companies seek to 
obtain business from other private companies who require their service 
providers to be BEE compliant. This is similarly the case in a number of 
transactions with financial institutions that are reluctant to lend funds or to 
provide business to non-compliant enterprises (Horwitz 2011: 309). In order to 
determine whether the objective contained in section 2(b) of the B-BBEEA has 
been achieved, it is necessary to outline what this objective entails. 
 
Section 2(b) of the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 
2003 
The main objective of the B-BBEEA is to ensure that wealth is distributed 
across as broad a spectrum of previously disadvantaged South Africans as 
possible.  
In terms of section 2(b) of the B-BBEEA, the B-BBEEA was enacted in 
order to facilitate broad-based black economic empowerment by achieving a 
substantial change in the racial composition of ownership and management 
structures and in the skilled occupations of existing and new enterprises. 
Statistics have been extracted from the reports compiled by the Department of 
Labour and the B-BBEE Commission to illustrate whether the said objective 
has been achieved.  
 
The statistics 
The tables below reflect the percentages of race groups in ownership structures, 
top and senior management structures of enterprises as well as on the skilled 
levels to determine whether the objective contained in section 2(b) of the B-
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Table 1:  Percentages of race groups on ownership levels (B-BBEE 
Commission 2019: 71) 
 
Description Black ownership 2017 Black ownership 
2018 
Agriculture 11.64 14 
Financial Sector 19.06 18.5 
Forestry 43.03 39.10 
Generic Codes 12.28 25 
Information communication  
Technology sector 
23.31 24.7 
Integrated transport sector 31.51 26 
Property sector 81.19 14 
Tourism sector 15.17 40.50 
 
The table above shows that in 2017 the percentage of black people on 
the ownership level was low, with the exception of the property sector. 
However, even within the property sector the percentage of black people on the 
ownership level decreased considerably by 2018, thus indicating that there has 
not been a substantial improvement in the racial composition of ownership 
structures.  
 
Table 2:  Percentages of race groups in top management (Department 
of Labour 2013 – 2014: 15; Department of Labour 2016 – 2017: 




2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2016 2018 
Whites 76.3 72.6 68.2 63.8 65.4 62.7 68.5 66.5 
Africans 14.9 17.9 18.8 20.3 18.5 19.8 14.4 15.1 
Coloureds 4 3.7 3.9 5.0 4.8 5.1 4.9 5.3 
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Table 3:  Percentages of race groups in senior management (Department 
of Labour 2013 – 2014: 16; Department of Labour 2016 – 2017: 




2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2016 2018 
Whites 72.7 72.4 65 61.9 59.1 57 58.1 54.4 
Africans 14.2 14.5 18.1 20 12.8 23 22.1 23.2 
Coloureds 6.3 6 6.1 6.4 7 7 7.7 8 
Indians 6.8 7 8.2 9.1 9.6 10.1 10.6 11.1 
 
The tables above show that since 2003 there has been a decline in the 
percentage of white people occupying positions at the levels of both top 
management and senior management (except during 2016). In addition, it 
shows that the percentage of African people at both the levels of top 
management and senior management has increased (except during 2011 and 
2016); however, they remain under-represented. Tables 2 and 3 show that there 
has not been a substantial change in the racial composition of management 
structures. 
 
Table 4:  Percentages of race groups on the professionally qualified level  
(Department of Department of Labour 2013 – 2014: 17; 
Department of Labour 2016-2017: 21; Department of Labour 




2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2016 2018 
Whites 49.2 61.3 57.2 43.7 42.3 40.6 37.5 37.4 
Africans 39 38.8 24.1 32.8 36.3 38.4 41.5 40.2 
Coloureds 6.1 9.3 8.5 13.5 10.2 9.6 9.7 10 
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Table 5:  Percentages of race groups on the skilled technical level 
(Department of Department of Labour 2013 – 2014: 18; 
Department of Labour 2016-2017: 26; Department of Labour 
2018 - 2019: 34) 
 
Skilled level 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2016 2018 
Whites 38.2 37.9 35.6 24 24 22 20.8 18.5 
Africans 42.1 38.8 44.1 57 57 59.2 60.2 63.3 
Coloureds 12.9 17 12.8 11.5 11.5 11.3 11.5 11.2 
Indians 6.8 6.2 6.7 6.2 6.2 5.9 5.8 5.4 
 
The tables above show that there has been a decline in the percentage of 
white people on the professionally qualified (except during 2005) and skilled 
technical levels. While there has been a decline in the percentage of Coloured 
(except during 2005 and 2016) and Indian people (except during 2007), there 
has been an increase in the number of African people (except during 2005) on 
the skilled technical level. As far as the professionally qualified level is 
concerned, there has been an increase in the percentage of African people 
(except during 2005 and 2007). Tables 4 and 5 illustrate that there has not been 
a substantial improvement in the representation of African, Coloured and Indian 
people on the professionally qualified level and within skilled technical 
occupations respectively. 
When one considers the slow rate at which change in the racial 
composition of the ownership and management structures of enterprises as well 
as in skilled occupations is taking place, it is understandable that the objective 
contained in section 2(b) has been included in the B-BBEEA. The figures 
reflected in the tables above illustrate that the objective contained in section 
2(b) of the B-BBEEA has not been achieved. Fronting practices and the ways in 
which fronting practices affect the achievement of the objective contained in 
section 2(b) of the B-BBEEA are discussed below.  
 
The commission of fronting practices 
Some enterprises have been accused of contravening the B-BBEEA deliberately 
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Fronting is seen as “tokenism for the superficial inclusion of historically 
disadvantaged individuals with no actual transfer of wealth or control” 
(M’Paradzi & Kalula 2007: 41). What this implies practically is that regulatory 
requirements are manipulated to such an extent that it amounts to fraud 
(M’Paradzi & Kalula 2007: 41).   
Fronting practices are defined by the B-BBEAA as “a transaction or 
other act or conduct that directly or indirectly undermines or frustrates the 
achievement of the objectives of the B-BBEEA or the implementation of any of 
the provisions of the B-BBEEA including, but not limited to practices in 
connection with a BEE initiative” (B-BBEEA: section 1). The B-BBEEA lists a 
number of practices, which fall within the definition of fronting practices.  
The commission of fronting practices frustrates and undermines the 
achievement of the objectives set out in the B-BBEEA or its implementation, 
because the objective of an enterprise committing a fronting practice is to create 
the impression that the enterprise is BEE compliant when this is not in fact the 
case, or to create the impression that an enterprise has a BEE recognition level 
higher than what that enterprise is entitled to. 
The wording used by the legislature in the definition of fronting is 
broad. It comprises the three most commonly known forms of fronting namely 
window dressing, benefit diversion and the use of opportunistic intermediaries 
(Warikandwa & Osode 2017: 17). The meaning of window dressing is covered 
by the wording used in subsection (a) of the definition of fronting (Warikandwa 
& Osode 2017: 17). Window dressing is where black persons “who are 
appointed to a position in an enterprise are discouraged or inhibited from 
substantially participating in the core activities of that enterprise” (B-BBEEA: 
section 1 (a)). This could involve appointing or promoting black people to 
senior positions without them having the necessary skills or experience and/or 
without providing them with work while in such positions (M’Paradzi & Kalula 
2007: 41).  
The impression is provided that the black person will be involved in 
certain work, however the black person in question is not provided with the 
opportunity to demonstrate his or her skills.  An example of window dressing is 
found in the facts which formed the subject matter of the case of Peel and 
others v Hamon J&C Engineering (Pty) Ltd and Others. In this case Hamon & 
Cie (International SA) sold its shares in Hamon SA (Pty) Ltd to two black 
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In terms of the Agreement for the sale of shares concluded between the 
parties, 13% of the shares in the company were sold to each woman (Peel 2013: 
para 17). The two black shareholders did not participate in any decision-making 
processes of the company (Peel 2013: para 19). Hamon & Cie (International 
SA) subsequently repurchased the shares from the two black women (Peel 
2013: para 31).  
In the case of Viking Pony Africa Pumps (Pty) Ltd t/a Tricom Africa v 
Hidro-Tech Systems (Pty) Ltd and Another, a complaint was lodged by Hidro-
Tech that historically disadvantaged individuals were not remunerated or 
allowed to “participate in the management of Viking to the degree 
commensurate with their shareholding and their positions as directors” (Viking 
2010: para 7). As a result, the Constitutional Court ordered that an investigation 
be launched into the alleged fraudulent conduct (Viking 2010: 59). These cases 
show that at times black people form part of ownership or management 
structures, however such black people are not always allowed to participate in 
the decision-making processes of the enterprises concerned. 
The meanings of benefit diversion and opportunistic intermediaries are 
covered by the wording used in subsections (b) and (d) of the definition of 
fronting respectively (Warikandwa & Osode 2017: 17). Benefit diversion 
includes “initiatives implemented where economic benefits received by an 
enterprise as a result of its BEE status fail to flow to black people in the ratio 
which is specified in relevant legal documents” (BBBEEA: section 1(b)).  
Opportunistic intermediaries include enterprises who have concluded 
agreements with other enterprises with the objective of “leveraging the 
opportunistic intermediary’s favourable BEE status” (Warikandwa & Osode 
2017: 17) where the agreement concluded involves “significant limitations or 
restrictions on the identity of the opportunistic intermediary’s suppliers, service 
providers, clients or customers; the maintenance of their business operations in 
a context reasonably considered improbable having regard to resources and 
terms and conditions that are not negotiated at arm’s-length and on a fair and 
reasonable basis” (B-BBEEA: section 1(d)). 
In the Viking case discussed above, Viking was characterised as being an 
opportunistic intermediary for tender procurement, because the actual benefits 
which were derived from tenders awarded to Viking were in fact channelled to 
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BEE has been said to have become a system of redistribution of wealth as 
opposed to being a process, which draws black people into productive activity 
as owners of capital. Minister Davies has been quoted as stating that 
 
the initial intention was that if you are a newcomer, you go into a 
partnership and there is active learning. But in practice there are deals 
made on paper and black people are not involved in its 
operations...Instead of an active partnership that empowers people to 
become real players, BEE has been for too few people and based too 
much on ownership. When people do a deal they think they are getting a 
partnership, but when they look at the fine print they find out that they 
are not (Paton 2011: 1). 
 
Davies refers to this as sophisticating fronting (Paton 2011: 1).  
In circumstances where window dressing takes place, where black 
people are appointed to positions, but are prevented from demonstrating their 
skills, there is a possibility that the black people who are victims of such 
practices will be ineligible for future promotions to more senior management 
positions. This ineligibility may arise as a result of black people not being 
allowed to demonstrate their skills in the position which constituted window 
dressing. It has been reported that window dressing is a reason for black 
employees leaving enterprises (Centre for Applied Legal Studies: 43). This 
would have a negative effect on the percentage of black people who occupy 
positions on management and ownership levels and those who form part of 
skilled occupations. Benefit diversion also affects black people negatively. 
Benefit diversion not only results in black people not receiving economic 
benefits which they are entitled to, but this failure to receive such benefits may 
also result in black people choosing to leave enterprises who employ them.  
In the Peel case discussed above, the company may have received 
economic benefits due to the company’s improved BEE rating. If legal 
documents existed which made provision for the two black females concerned 
to have received economic benefits, the two black females would not have 
received some or all of the economic benefits as a result of their shares being 
repurchased.  Practices such as these have a negative effect on the percentage of 
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Fronting practices such as window dressing and benefit diversion negatively 
affect the percentage of black people who form part of management and 
ownership structures, as well as skilled occupations.  
Where enterprises commit fronting practices, this negatively affects not 
only the already low percentages of black people reflected as occupying 
positions on the ownership and management levels as well as in skilled 
occupations, but also negatively affects the achievement of the objective 
contained in section 2(b) of the B-BBEEA. The B-BEEA does make provision 
for a number of enforcement measures that are available in the event of an 
enterprise being involved in the commission of fronting practices. These 
measures are discussed below. 
 
Enforcement measures enacted by the B-BBEEA 
The B-BBEEA establishes an advisory council (B-BBEEA: section 4). The 
council reviews the progress made in achieving BEE in order to make policy 
recommendations to address any challenges that are experienced by black 
people and enterprises insofar as BEE implementation is concerned.  
The B-BBEEA also establishes a Broad-Based Black Economic 
Empowement Commission (‘B-BBEE Commission’). The Commission is 
mandated to 
 
oversee, supervise and promote adherence with the B-BBEEA, to 
strengthen and foster collaboration between the public and the private 
sector in order to promote and safeguard the objectives of the B-BBEA, 
to receive complaints relating to BEE, to investigate either on its own 
initiative or in response to complaints received any matter concerning 
BEE, to promote advocacy, access to opportunities and educational 
programmes and initiatives of BEE, to maintain a registry of major BEE 
transactions above a threshold determined by the Minister, to receive 
and analyse such reports as may be prescribed concerning BEE 
compliance from organs of state, public entities and private sector 
enterprises, to promote good governance and accountability by creating 
an effective environment for promotion and implementation of BEE and 
to exercise such powers which are not in conflict with the B-BBEEA 
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With reference to the functions of the B-BBEE Commission, a 
commissioner of the B-BBEE Commission has stated that “we are here to fill 
the monitoring gap that existed since 2003 and to make sure that black 
economic empowerment really does take place and that it benefits the many and 
not the few. We are also here to ensure that the mistakes of the recent past are 
not repeated” (Ntuli 2018: 1). The B-BBEE Commission was established in 
2016 with the main objective of combating fronting practices (Ntuli 2018: 1). 
Compliance with the provisions governing BEE is voluntary, however 
organs of state, public entities (B-BBEE Codes 2013: para 3.1.1) and all 
measured entities which undertake any financial activities with public entities 
are required to be BEE compliant (B-BBEE Codes 2013: para 3.1.2). The B-
BBEEA places an obligation on spheres of government, public entities, organs 
of state, public companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange and all 
Sectoral Educational and Training Authorities contemplated in the Skills 
Development Act 97 of 1998 to report to the Commission on their compliance 
with BEE (B-BBEEA: section 13G).  
In the event of contraventions of the B-BBEEA or any complaints 
regarding BEE, the B-BBEEA has included provisions relating to relief, which 
may be obtained by aggrieved parties and the procedure to be followed to 
obtain the said relief. As regards the procedure, a complaint may be lodged with 
the B-BBEE Commission in a form prescribed by the B-BBEEA (B-BBEEA: 
section 13F (2) (a)). Complaints may be investigated by the B-BBEE 
Commission both on receipt of a complaint and on the B-BBEE commission's 
own initiative (B-BBEEA: section 13J (1)). The procedure and format of the 
investigation must be determined by the B-BBEE Commission in which case 
the circumstances of the particular case are taken into consideration (B-
BBEEA: section 13J(2)).  The B-BBEE Commission may make a finding on 
whether any BEE initiative involves a fronting practice (B-BBEEA: section 13J 
(3)).  
Legal proceedings may be instituted in a court by the B-BBEE 
Commission to restrain any breach of the B-BBEEA, “including any fronting 
practice, or to obtain appropriate remedial relief” (B-BBEEA: section 13J (4)). 
In the event of the B-BBEE Commission being of the view that the investigated 
matter involves the commission of a criminal offence, the B-BBEE 
Commission must refer the matter to an appropriate division of the South 
African Police Service, or the National Prosecuting Authority (B-BBEEA: 










Jeannine van de RHEEDE: The Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment 
Act 53 of 2003 and the ways in which the commission of fronting practices 
affects the achievement of its objective 
The B-BBEE Commission may refer any concerns regarding behaviour 
or conduct that may be prohibited or regulated by legislation to the South 
African Revenue Service (B-BBEEA: section 13(J)(6)(a)) or any regulatory 
body where the B-BBEE Commission has conducted an investigation and 
justifiable reasons exist for the B-BBEE Commission to do so (B-BBEEA: 
section 13(J)(6)(b).  
The B-BBEE Commission has the power to publish any 
recommendation or finding on the investigation which was conducted (B-
BBEEA: section 13(J)(7)(a)). The B-BBEE Commission may issue a summons 
to any person who is believed to be able to furnish information on the 
investigation conducted or to be in possession of any book or document that has 
any bearing on the investigation, to appear before the B-BBEE Commission (B-
BBEEA: section K(1)(a)). 
In terms of section 13(O) (1) (a) of the B-BBEEA, a person commits an 
offence by knowingly either misrepresenting or attempting to misrepresent the 
BEE status of a measured entity. It is also an offence to misrepresent or provide 
false information to a BEE verification professional to secure a BEE status or to 
misrepresent or provide false information in assessing the BEE status of an 
enterprise to any organ of state or public entity or to engage in a fronting 
practice (B-BBEEA: section 13(O)(1)).  
Criminal liability is also extended to other parties, which include 
procurement officers, verification agencies, or officials of a public entity or an 
organ of state who become aware of the commission or attempt to commit any 
offence and fail to report it to an appropriate law enforcement agency (B-
BBEEA: section 13(O)(2).  As regards sanctions for a contravening section 
13(O)(1), a person convicted of an offence in terms of the B-BBEEA is liable 
for payment of a fine or for imprisonment not exceeding 10 years or to both a 
fine and imprisonment, or if the convicted person is not a natural person, to a 
fine not exceeding 10% of its annual turnover (B-BBEEA: section 13(O) 
(3)(a)). In the event of there being a contravention of section 13(O)(2), a person 
is liable to pay a fine or may be imprisoned for a period not exceeding 12 
months or both a fine and imprisonment (B-BBEEA: section 13(O)(3)(b). 
The B-BBEEA provides a number of punitive measures against 
enterprises who choose to circumvent its objectives. One of the most important 
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The legislature can be commended for the heavy sanctions, which are provided 
in section 13(O) (3) against persons, or businesses that are found guilty of 
contravening sections 13(O) (1) and (2) of the B-BBEEA.  
The legislative provision for the criminal liability of additional parties 
where they fail to report to the appropriate law enforcement agency in the event 
of their knowledge of the commission or attempted commission of an offence, 
has been described as being an effective deterrent (Sibanda 2015: 38). This is 
because these parties are positioned to detect contraventions of the B-BBEEA 
(Sibanda 2015: 38). However, this may not be an effective deterrent in all 
circumstances. Smith has argued that this is because fronting has become 
sophisticated, where black people may occupy executive positions, without 
obtaining any control or benefits and are unaware that they are being used for 
fronting (Smith 2019: 1). The additional parties to whom criminal liability has 
been extended will seldomly be aware of the fact that while occupying senior 
positions the black people are not obtaining the benefits and control which 
usually flow from these positions. 
The enforcement measures discussed above illustrates that the 
legislature has enacted a number of provisions aimed at reducing the number of 
fronting practices, which are committed. It does, however, raise the question 
whether these measures are effective in achieving its goals. 
 
Conclusion 
The B-BBEEA contains a number of objectives. However, this article focused 
on the objective contained in section 2(b). In terms of section 2(b), the B-
BBEEA is aimed at facilitating broad-based black economic empowerment by 
achieving a substantial change in the racial composition of ownership and 
management structures and in the skilled occupations of existing and new 
enterprises. The statistics reflected above show that this objective has not been 
achieved. Fronting practices negatively affect the achievement of this objective. 
Enforcement measures have been enacted by the legislature in order to 
eliminate fronting practices. The existence of these enforcement measures does 
raise the question whether the enforcement measures are successful in reducing 
fronting practices and whether in the event of this being the case, whether it 
reduces the fronting practices which negatively affect the achievement of the 
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